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(even solitary midnight feasts) and feasters, and football matches and foot-
ballers of distinct ontological categories? Well, football may be a game of two
halves, but the first half of a football match is not itself a football match,
whereas (ignoring the distinction between phase and substance sortals for the
moment) as endurantists (all those who accept that continuants endure in the
original sense defined in the text) would agree, every temporal part of a
footballer is a footballer. Not ignoring the distinction between phase and
substance sortals, we can say that if a substance sortal ‘F’ is a term for a
type of continuant, every temporal part of an F is an F. That is the distinction
between continuant terms and event-or-process terms and therewith between
continuants and events-or-processes themselves.
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Bringing about and conjunction: a reply to Bigelow
on omnificence
GHISLAIN GUIGON
1. Bigelow (2005) has argued, adapting an argument from Humberstone,
that from
(B2) There is a finite class of actual beings such that,
for any contingent proposition p,
if p then some being in this class did bring it about that p.
we can derive,
(B3) There is an actual being G such that,
for any contingent proposition p,
if p then G brought it about that p.
Thus, that there is an omnificent being.
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Humberstone’s (1985) original argument is that, on the assumption that
the knowledge operator is monotonic, from
(K2) For any true proposition p,
there is someone who knows that p.
we can derive
(K3) There is someone who knows every truth.
Thus, that there is an omniscient being.
Atheists should agree with Bigelow that the derivation from (B2) to (B3)
constitutes a challenge. For, in contrast to (K2), (B2) is plausible, and (B3) is
remarkably close to the thesis that there is a God. In this article, I shall
indicate three ways to block Bigelow’s challenge to atheism. One way
makes Bigelow’s reasoning, if sound, worthless to the atheist; the other
two make it unsound.
2. Bigelow’s derivation from (B2) to (B3) runs as follows. Suppose for reduc-
tio that (B2) is true and (B3) is false. By (B2), for any contingent truth p
something brought it about that p. But by the negation of (B3) for each actual
being x, there is some true contingent proposition q(x) that x did not bring it
about that it is so. Now form X, the conjunction of all the true contingent
propositions of the form (q(x) and x did not bring it about that q(x)).
A conjunction of contingent truths is contingent and true. Hence by (B2)
something, y, brought it about that X. Then y brought it about that X;
and yet, by the negation of (B3), y did not bring it about q(y), which is
one of the conjuncts of X. Yet this is absurd. Therefore, if (B2) is true, so
is (B3). (Bigelow 2005: 191–92).1
The reductio is complete in the presence of the following ancillary
assumption:
1 Because this is a reply to his paper, I stick here to Bigelow’s presentation of the reductio.
But it should be noted that, in his original reductio about knowledge, Humberstone (1985:
401) appeals to no such conjunction of all the propositions of the form (q(x) and x does
not know that q(x)). What Humberstone appeals to is an arbitrary conjunction such that
to each knower there corresponds some conjunct of the latter that this knower does not
know. That such an arbitrary conjunction can be formed, provided (K2) is true and (K3) is
false, is uncontroversial. However, we can question whether X can be formed. For we can
wonder whether or not X is a proposition such that something did not bring it about that
X. That everything did bring it about that X yields, on the assumption that (B3) is false,
the implausible result that nothing is such that it did bring about every conjunct of X even
though everything brought it about that X. On the other hand, if there is some z such that
z did not bring it about that X, then there is a true proposition of the form (X(z) and z did
not bring it about that X(z)), which has X as a conjunct. But since X is the conjunction of
all the true propositions of the form (q(x) and x did not bring it about that q(x)), (X(z)
and z did not bring it about that X(z)) is a conjunct of X. If so X is a conjunct of a
proposition that is a conjunct of X, and so X fails to be well-founded.
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(CB) for any contingent p and q and for any x, if x brings it about that
p& q, then x brings it about that p and x brings it about that q.
(CB) is a corollary of the assumption that the bringing about operator is
monotonic. Bigelow offers no motivation in favour of (CB). The question
is: what brings about conjunctions of contingent truths? I shall consider three
plausible candidates:
(i) What brings it about that p& q is what changes a state of the world in
which p& q is false into a state of the world in which p& q is true.
(ii) What brings it about that p& q is the mereological fusion of what
brings it about that p and what brings it about that q.
(iii) What brings it about that p and what brings it about that q jointly
bring it about that p& q.
I shall first argue that if (i) is the case, then (CB) fails. Then I shall argue that
if (ii) is the case, and (B2) and (CB) are both true, commitment to an omni-
ficent being is compatible with atheism. Finally, I shall argue that if (iii) is the
case, then (B2) plausibly fails.
3. Humberstone (1977) has argued that, on the assumption that (i) is true,
(CB) fails by means of a simple counter-example. Suppose there is a cup and
nothing else on the table, and I have a saucer in my hand. Then by placing the
saucer on the table I bring it about that there is a cup and a saucer on the
table, because I change a state of the world in which it is false that there is a
cup and a saucer on the table into one in which it is true that there is a cup
and a saucer on the table. Yet, I do not bring it about that there is a cup on
the table since the latter was true before I acted. Therefore, if (i) is true, then
(CB) fails and Bigelow’s derivation is unsound.
4. However, one may argue that if I do not bring it about that there is a cup
on the table, then I do not bring it about that there is a cup and a saucer on
the table on the grounds that what brought it about that there is a cup on
the table should be part of what brings it about that there is a cup and a
saucer on the table.
Consider another example. Suppose that the Big Bang brought it about
that there is matter and that the Georgian government’s assault against South
Ossetia brought it about that Russia invaded Georgia. It seems misleading to
affirm that the Georgian government’s assault against South Ossetia brought
it about that there is matter and Russia invaded Georgia even if it is true that
the Georgian government’s assault against South Ossetia changed a state of
the world in which it is false that there is matter and Russia invaded Georgia
into a state of the world in which that conjunction is true. Because the Big
Bang is what brought it about that there is matter, the Big Bang should be
part of what brought it about that there is matter and Russia invaded
Georgia as well.
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One may thus uphold (ii) instead of (i) and maintain the following as a
principle of action theory:
(FB) for any contingent p, q and any x and y, if x brings it about that p
and y brings it about that q, then the mereological fusion of x and y
brings it about that p& q.
Suppose that (B2) is true so that, for every contingent p, there is something
that brought it about that p. Now form Y, the conjunction of every contin-
gent truth. By (FB) what brought it about that Y is the mereological fusion of
all the entities that brought about some contingent truth. If so and if (CB) is
true, the mereological fusion of all the entities is our omnificent being: it
brought about every contingent truth. Obviously, commitment to the exis-
tence of the mereological fusion of all the entities that brought about some
contingent truth is compatible with atheism. Therefore, adding (FB) to (B2)
and (CB) makes the conclusion of Bigelow’s derivation compatible with
atheism.
However, that (CB) and (FB) are both true seems unlikely. Suppose they
are and suppose again that the Big Bang brought it about that there is matter
and that the Georgian government’s assault against South Ossetia brought it
about that Russia invaded Georgia. By (FB) the mereological fusion of the
Big Bang and the Georgian government’s assault against South Ossetia
brought it about that there is matter and Russia invaded Georgia. And by
(CB) the mereological fusion of the Big Bang and the Georgian government’s
assault against South Ossetia brought it about that there is matter. But the
latter is counterintuitive. How could the Georgian government’s assault
against South Ossetia be part of what brought it about that there is matter?2
5. It is somewhat counterintuitive to assume that there is a single entity, the
Big Bang and myself somehow mereologically fused, that brought it about
that there is matter and the saucer is on the table. We may thus reject (ii) and
instead uphold (iii): what brings it about that p and what brings it about that
q jointly bring it about that p& q. What does it mean to jointly bring it about
that some truth is so?
The bringing about operator is an operator of causal grounding: if I bring
it about that the light is on by switching the light on, then I causally ground
that the light is on; the light is on because of me.
Consider the following operator of partial grounding (Correia 2005: 60):
(PG) for any x, x partially grounds A iff there are some y, . . . such that x,
y, . . . ground A (where each member of the list ‘x, y, . . .’ is assumed
2 This reasoning is analogous to Rodriguez-Pereyra’s (2006: 970–71) objection against
(CB)’s counterpart in Truthmaker Theory: the left-to-right direction of the popular
Conjunction Thesis.
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to non-trivially contribute to the grounding of A; i.e. to play a role
in the grounding of A).
Then, let an operator of partial bringing about be defined as follows:
(PB) for any contingent p and any x, x partially brings it about that p iff
there are some y, . . . such that x, y, . . . ground that p is the case
(where grounding is causal).
So a partial cause for a given truth is something which helps bring it about
that that truth is so. In contrast, let us say that
(B) for any contingent p and any x, x brings it about that p iff x grounds
that p is the case (where grounding is causal).
Suppose now that a brings it about that p and b brings it about that q. Then
to say that what brings it about that p and what brings it about that q jointly
bring it about that p& q means that
(JB) each of a and b partially brings it about that p& q but none of them
brings it about that p& q.
Suppose that (iii) is true. Then, unless we beg the question in favour of an
actual omnificent being, there can be conjunctions of contingent truths such
that no actual being did bring it about that they are so, but such that several
actual beings jointly brought it about that they are so. Plausibly, that Julius
Caesar and John F. Kennedy have been assassinated is one such conjunction.
If so, (iii) being assumed, (B2) plausibly fails and should be replaced by the
following:
(B2*) There is a finite class of actual beings such that,
for any contingent p,
if p then some being in this class partially brought it about that p.3
However, nothing like the claim that there is an omnificent being follows
from (B2*) and (CB).
If we maintain the following counterpart of (CB), then we can at best
derive that there is a partial omnificent being; something such that, for
every contingent truth, it did help bring it about that that truth is so:
(CB*) For any contingent p, q and for any x, if x partially brings it
about that p& q, then x partially brings it about that p and x
partially brings it about that q.4
3 Instead of (B2*), we might have proposed the following substitute to (B2): there is a finite
class of actual beings such that, for any contingent p, if p then either some being in this
class brought it about that p or some beings in this class jointly brought it about that p.
However, the latter entails (B2*) by definition. Notice also that the theoretical role of (B2)
is to assert that every contingent truth is causally grounded and that (B2*) plays this role
equally well.
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But (CB*) is highly implausible on the assumption that (iii) is true. For
assume that the Big Bang and the Georgian government’s assault against
South Ossetia jointly brought it about that there is matter and Russia invaded
Georgia. Then (CB*) tells us that the Georgian government’s assault against
South Ossetia partially brought it about that there is matter. This is so
because, (iii) being assumed, the Georgian government’s assault against
South Ossetia partially brought it about that there is matter and Russia
invaded Georgia. Yet there is no way the Georgian government’s assault
against South Ossetia can have helped causing that there is matter.
6. I offered three plausible accounts of what brings about conjunctions of
contingent truths. I have shown that each of these accounts allows us to
undermine Bigelow’s derivation of an omnificent being: the first falsifies
(CB) and makes Bigelow’s derivation unsound; the second makes commit-
ment to an omnificent being compatible with atheism and Bigelow’s deriva-
tion harmless if sound; according to the third, it is plausible that (B2) fails.
Is there a further candidate for what brings about conjunctions of contin-
gent truths that would make Bigelow’s derivation sound and its conclusion
inconsistent with atheism? Yes, an omnificent supernatural agent. But if one
needs to beg the question in favour of a supernatural agent to make it sound
and its conclusion incompatible with atheism, Bigelow’s derivation of an
omnificent being must be regarded as a further failed attempt of a proof
that there is a God.5
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4 That there is a partial omnificent being can be derived from (B2*) and (CB*) by reductio.
Suppose that (B2*) is true and that there is no partial omnificent being. Then every
contingent truth is such that something partially brought it about that it is so; and yet,
for every entity x, there is a true contingent proposition q(x) such that x did not partially
bring it about that q(x). Form X*, the conjunction of all the true propositions of the form
(q(x) and x did not partially bring it about that q(x)). By (B2*), there is a y such that y
partially brought it about that X*; and yet, since there is no partial omnificent being, y did
not partially bring it about that q(y), which is a conjunct of X*. By (CB*) however, since y
partially brought it about that X*, y partial brought about each conjunct of X*, including
q(y). Contradiction.
5 I would like to thank John Bigelow, Fabrice Correia, Jack Darach, Lloyd Humberstone,
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Kate Salter and the participants to the 9th eidos meeting for
their helpful comments.
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The Simulation Argument: some explanations
NICK BOSTROM
Anthony Brueckner, in a recent article, proffers ‘a new way of thinking about
Bostrom’s Simulation Argument’ (2008). His comments, however, miscon-
strue the argument; and some words of explanation are in order.
The Simulation Argument purports to show, given some plausible assump-
tions, that at least one of three propositions is true (Bostrom 2003; see also
Bostrom 2005). Roughly stated, these propositions are: (1) almost all civili-
zations at our current level of development go extinct before reaching tech-
nological maturity; (2) there is a strong convergence among technologically
mature civilizations such that almost all of them lose interest in creating
ancestor-simulations; (3) almost all people with our sorts of experiences
live in computer simulations. I also argue (#) that conditional on (3) you
should assign a very high credence to the proposition that you live in a
computer simulation. However, pace Brueckner, I do not argue that we
should believe that we are in simulation.1 In fact, I believe that we are prob-
ably not simulated. The Simulation Argument purports to show only that, as
well as (#), at least one of (1)–(3) is true; but it does not tell us which one.
Brueckner also writes:
It is worth noting that one reason why Bostrom thinks that the number
of Sims [computer-generated minds with experiences similar to those
typical of normal, embodied humans living in a Sim-free early 21st
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1 Brueckner writes (224): ‘Nick Bostrom has argued that given some plausible assumptions,
we should believe that we are not humans but rather conscious computer simulations of
humans (Bostrom 2003).’
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